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EXCULPATORY LIABILITIES AND PARTNERSHIP
NONRECOURSE ALLOCATIONS
Karen C. Burke*
1. INTRODUCTION
The rise of limited liability companies (LLCs) classified as partnerships for
federal income tax purposes challenges traditional assumptions concerning the
treatment of recourse and nonrecourse liabilities under Subchapter K.' The com-
plex rules of sections 704(b) and 752 give little attention to liabilities that are
recourse to the entity under section 1001 but for which no member bears the
economic risk of loss under section 752.2 In comparison to traditional general or
limited partnerships, however, LLCs are much more likely to incur such "excul-
patory" liabilities because of the limited liability shield under state law.3 Under
the existing regulations for section 704(b) and 752 (the "section 704(b)/752
regulations"), the classification of liabilities as either recourse or nonrecourse is
essential for purposes of allocating basis and deductions attributable to such
liabilities Although exculpatory liabilities are functionally quite similar to tra-
ditional nonrecourse liabilities secured by all of an LLC's assets, literal applica-
tion of the section 704(b)/752 regulations with respect to such liabilities is
fraught with difficulties.
5
*Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego School of Law; Smith College, B.A.
1972; Harvard University, M.A. 1975; Ph.D. 1979; Stanford Law School, J.D. 1982. The author
acknowledges generous research support from the University of San Diego School of Law.
'The reference to LLCs also includes limited liability partnerships (LLPs) and similar business
entities that, under state law, shield individual members from personal liability for entity-level debts.
The explosive growth in the number of LLCs is largely attributable to the liberalization of the entity
classification rules in 1996. See Reg. § 301.7701-3 (elective classification of eligible entities).
2See Clayton S. Reynolds, Treatment of Recourse Liabilities in the Context of a Limited Liability
Company, 74 TAXES 397, 397 (1996). The preamble to the final section 704(b) regulations, promul-
gated in 1991, recognizes that a partnership may have a liability "that is not secured by any specific
property and that is recourse to the partnership as an entity, but explicitly not recourse to any partner
(exculpatory liability)." T.D. 8385, 1992-1 C.B. 199. See also T.D. 8380, 1992-1 C.B. 218. For a
contemporary view by one of the principal authors of the nonrecourse regulations, see Susan Pace
Hamill, Final Regulations Concerning Liabilities Join Substantial Economic Effect Rules, 9 J. PART-
NERSHIP TAX'N 99 (1992).
3An exculpatory liability may arise in a general or limited partnership if the recourse lender has
exculpated all of the general partners from personal liability. See William B. Brannan, The Subchap-
ter KAct of 1997, 75 TAx NoTEs (TA) 121, 125 (Apr. 7 1997). The difference is that in an LLC any
general unsecured liability is an exculpatory liability, since all of the members are statutorily pro-
tected from personal liability. See id.; see, e.g., Limited Liability Company Act, Del. Code Ann. tit.
6, § 18-303 (2003).
4See Reg. §§ 1.752-1(a)(1), -1(a)(2), 1.704-2(b)(3) (defining recourse liability, defining nonre-
course liability, and cross-referencing the § 752 definition of nonrecourse liability, respectively); see
also Reg. §§ 1.704-1, -2 (recourse deductions and nonrecourse deductions).
'See Reynolds, supra note 2; see also Bryan P. Collins, Glenn E. Dance & Monte A. Jackel,
Allocating Debt-Financed Losses of an LLC under Section 704(b), 2 J. LTD. LIAa. Co. 135 (1995);
Kenneth Heller & James Boyd, Partnership Liabilities: IRS Interpretation Helpful But Further
Guidance Needed, 13 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX'N 243 (1996); Christine Rucinski Strong & Susan Pace
Hamill, Allocations Attributable to Partner Nonrecourse Liabilities: Issues Revealed by LLCs and
LLPs, 51 ALA. L. REV. 603 (2000).
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Under these regulations, the allocation of tax items attributable to nonrecourse
liabilities is extraordinarily permissive: since no partner bears the economic risk
of loss attributable to such liabilities, the corresponding deductions may be
allocated in virtually any manner the parties desire.6 Upon disposition of the
underlying property, however, the partners who received such deductions must
be allocated offsetting gain and income to restore any capital account deficits,
thereby vindicating the earlier loss allocations.7 The underlying premise of the
nonrecourse allocation rules -is that it is possible to identify the partnership's
nonrecourse liabilities and track the deductions generated by such liabilities for
purposes of allocating the corresponding basis and losses." Because of their
hybrid nature as recourse liabilities for purposes of section 1001, and nonre-
course liabilities for purposes of section 752, exculpatory liabilities challenge
the basic premises of this somewhat oversimplified description of the nonre-
course allocation rules. Indeed, as two recent articles demonstrate, the uncer-
tainty and lack of consensus concerning the treatment of exculpatory liabilities
within the framework of the section 704(b)/752 regulations is quite remarkable.9
This article seeks to disentangle the treatment of exculpatory liabilities under
the nonrecourse allocation rules and suggests several needed reforms. Part II
concludes that an exculpatory liability should be treated similarly to a traditional
nonrecourse liability for purposes of determining economic risk of loss upon a
constructive liquidation. Part III argues that the mechanical provisions of the
nonrecourse allocation rules can be. properly applied to exculpatory liabilities
once it is clearly understood that the nonrecourse standard of sections 704(b)
and 752 diverges fundamentally from the nonrecourse standard of section 1001.
Part IV discusses related problems that arise because exculpatory liabilities are
secured not by particular assets but rather by all of an LLC's assets. Finally, Part
V suggests that the section 704(b) regulations should be amended to harmonize
the treatment of guaranteed recourse liabilities of an LLC (or recourse loans
from an LLC member) and functionally similar guaranteed nonrecourse liabili-
ties of an LLC (or nonrecourse loans from an LLC member).
While clarifying these issues is necessary to provide certainty in the tax treat-
ment of exculpatory liabilities, this article also suggests the need to rethink the
6See, e.g., George K. Yin, The Taxation of Private 'Business Enterprises: Some Policy Questions
Stimulated by the 'Check-the-Box" Regulations, 51 SMU L. REv. 125, 150-52 (1997); Brannan,
supra note 3, at 122-24.
7See Reg. § 1.704-2(f) (minimum gain chargeback).
8See infra noteg 50-53 and accompanying text.
9See Terence Floyd Cuff, Indebtedness of a Disregarded Entity, 81 TAXES 303, 303 (2003) ("Part-
ners and tax practitioners throw around terms like recourse debt and nonrecourse debt with reckless
abandon. We may imagine that we understand [their meaning but] terms such as nonrecourse debt
are not so clearly defined [or] well understood."); Bethany Atkins Rice, Does. Regulation Section
1.704-2 Permit Special Allocations of Nonrecourse Deductions Attributable to Exculpatory Liabili-
ties?, 56 TAX LAW. 155, 170-71 (2002) (arguing that ."[allthough special allocations of nonrecourse
deductions attributable to exculpatory liabilities are warranted based on well-settled tax policy,
under current law-exculpatory liabilities not allocated to specific properties do not justify special
allocations of nonrecourse deductions").
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nonrecourse definition under sections 704(b), 752, and 1001. Upon a disposition
of property encumbered by liabilities in excess of fair market value, the section
1001 regulations draw a distinction between recourse and nonrecourse liabili-
ties; the latter generate section 1001 gain through relief from the underlying
liability, while the former generate a combination of section 1001 gain (or loss)
and ordinary income from discharge of indebtedness. I0 Although the conceptual
model underlying the section 704(b)/752 regulations is derived from section
1001 and Tufts v. Commissioner," the drafters failed to clearly articulate and
rationalize the manner in which the nonrecourse allocation rules deviate from
the section 1001 standard. 2 Consequently, uncertainty persists concerning the
precise boundaries between the nonrecourse definitions of sections 704(b), 752,
and 1001. Ultimately, such uncertainty can be dispelled only if the section
704(b)/752 regulations construct a theory of nonrecourse allocations that is ex-
plicitly independent of the section 1001 standard. 3
II. APPLYING ECONOMIC RISK OF LOSS TO DETERMINE
PARTNERSHIP NONRECOURSE LIABILITIES
A. Overview
Broadly speaking, the section 704(b) regulations divide partnership alloca-
tions between recourse and nonrecourse deductions. Nonrecourse deductions,
defined as deductions attributable to nonrecourse liabilities, cannot have eco-
nomic effect because the creditor alone bears the economic burden attributable
to such liabilities.' 4 While nonrecourse deductions generally fall under the non-
recourse safe harbor provisions of the section 704(b) regulations, 5 all other
deductions are generally governed by the substantial economic effect (SEE)
test.' 6 Similarly, the section 752 regulations bifurcate partnership liabilities be-
tween recourse and nonrecourse. 1 The overarching goal of the section 752 regu-
lations is to assign liabilities to those partners who will ultimately receive the
"
5See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
"Tufts v. Commissioner, 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
'
2For example, the section 704(b) and section 752 regulations employ the term nonrecourse liabili-
ties in a highly specialized and sometimes artificial manner; by constructing a definition of nonre-
course liabilities and nonrecourse deductions independent of the section 1001 standard, the drafters
presumably intended to ensure that a disposition of encumbered property would always trigger
minimum gain equal to the excess of any section 752 nonrecourse liability over the basis of such
property, regardless of the characterization of the debt for purposes of section 1001. See infra notes
80-90 and accompanying text.
3See Cuff, supra note 9, at 363.
4Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(1). The reference to nonrecourse deductions does not include deductions
attributable to section 1001 nonrecourse liabilities for which a partner bears the economic risk of
loss, e.g., as a guarantor or creditor; such deductions must generally be allocated to the partner who
bears the economic risk of loss. See Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(4), -2(i) (partner nonrecourse deductions); see
also infra notes 129-38 and accompanying text.
"
5See Reg. § 1.704-2(e).
6See Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2).
7See Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(1), -l(a)(2).
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corresponding deductions. 8 Since liabilities follow losses, each partner should
have sufficient outside basis to utilize her share of partnership deductions. Al-
though the section 704(b)/752 regulations set forth rules for partnership alloca-
tions that are often excruciatingly detailed, the treatment of exculpatory liabili-
ties of an LLC remains puzzling.
Commentators have argued that literal application of the section 704(b)/752
regulations to exculpatory liabilities of an LLC gives rise to strange and unex-
pected results. 1 Since the regulations were largely completed prior to the advent
of LLCs, it is hardly surprising that the drafters failed to appreciate fully the
importance of the limited liability shield for such entities °.2 If an LLC classified
as a partnership incurs a traditional nonrecourse liability secured by specific
assets, the liability and corresponding deductions are generally allocated under
the nonrecourse portion of the section 704(b)/752 regulations in the same man-
ner as if the nonrecourse liability were incurred by a general or limited partner-
ship.2' The limited liability shield is irrelevant because the contractual agreement
between the entity and the lender suffices to eliminate any personal liability for
the LLC members. Thus, the allocation of traditional nonrecourse liabilities
generally does not depend on whether the business is formally organized as a
general partnership, limited partnership, or LLC.
The situation is different, however, if an LLC classified as a partnership
incurs a general, unsecured liability or a liability secured by all of its assets for
which none of the members is personally liable. In the case of a general partner-
ship, the recourse nature of the liability to the entity flows through to the general
partners who have a state law obligation to repay the debt if the partnership's
assets are insufficient.22 In the case of an LLC, however, a liability that is
recourse to the entity may be functionally nonrecourse to the members as a
result of the limited liability shield.23 Such an exculpatory liability should be
treated as nonrecourse under the section 752 regulations, since no partner bears
the economic risk of loss for the liability. 4 Regulation section 1.704-2(b)(3),
which cross-references the definition of nonrecourse liabilities under the section
752 regulations, treats an exculpatory liability as nonrecourse for purposes of the
section 704(b) regulations.2 ' Nonrecourse classification of an exculpatory liabil-
"A partner's share of recourse liabilities is based on the obligation to repay the creditor, as
determined under a constructive liquidation. Reg. § 1.752-2(b). A partner's share of nonrecourse
liabilities equals the sum of the partner's share of partnership minimum gain, section 704(c) mini-
mum gain, and excess nonrecourse liabilities that have not yet generated nonrecourse deductions.
Reg. § 1.752-3(a).
19See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 397 (results are obviously incorrect); see also Cuff, supra note 9,
at 303-04 (sections 704(b), 752, and 1001 regulations are "badly drafted, incomplete, ambiguous,
and sometimes internally inconsistent").2 See Strong & Hamill, supra note 5, at 668; Reynolds, supra note 2, at 397.21See Strong & Hamill, supra note 5, at 658.22See id. at 659.23This is particularly true for a single purpose entity when the lender requires a blanket security
interest. See Cuff, supra note 9, at 339.24See Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(2).
"See Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(3); see also T.D. 8385, 1992-1 C.B. 199.
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ity under the section 704(b)/752 regulations has important repercussions: alloca-
tion of liabilities and losses should generally be governed by the nonrecourse
rules, consistent with the notion that no member bears the economic risk of loss.
Notwithstanding the nonrecourse characterization under the section 704(b)/
752 regulations, most commentators agree that an exculpatory liability should be
treated as recourse for purposes of section 1001.26 In general, the section 1001
regulations distinguish between recourse and nonrecourse liabilities based on
whether the debtor is personally liable for repayment of the obligation (an un-
limited or personal liability) or the creditor's remedy is instead limited to one or
more assets of the debtor (a limited liability).2 7 Whether a liability is treated as
recourse or nonrecourse for purposes of section 1001 apparently depends on the
form of the debt rather than the character of the borrower.28 Because the section
1001 regulations disregard the practical consequences at the member level, an
LLC's exculpatory liabilities should retain their character as section 1001 re-
course liabilities.29
Under section 1001, the classification of a liability as recourse or nonrecourse
affects the tax consequences upon a disposition of encumbered property. While
a disposition of property subject to a nonrecourse debt in excess of fair market
value triggers Tufts gain,30 a similar disposition involving recourse debt triggers
a combination of gain (or loss) and potential income from cancellation of debt
(COD).3 In both situations, the borrower must take into account the entire
liability for tax purposes; thus, the combined amount (but not the character) of
the section 1001 gain (or loss) and COD income will be the same. The notion of
Tufts gain upon a disposition of property subject to a nonrecourse liability pro-
vides the conceptual framework underlying the treatment of nonrecourse liabili-
ties under the section 704(b)/752 regulations. Thus, it may seem odd that a
liability may be recourse for purposes of section 1001 but nevertheless nonre-
course for purposes of sections 704(b) and 752.32
26See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 401 (noting schizophrenic treatment of exculpatory liabilities as
recourse for purposes of section 1001 but nonrecourse for purposes of sections 704(b) and 752); see
also Cuff, supra note 9, at 342 (if a recourse loan to a corporation is treated as an unlimited liability
under section 1001, "[it is not readily apparent why there should be a different answer" in the
partnership context); Rice, supra note 9, at 161 n.32 (since section 1001 applies to a partnership as
an entity, an exculpatory liability should be treated as recourse for purposes of section 1001).
27The section 1001 regulations do not provide a comprehensive definition of the terms recourse
and nonrecourse. See Reg. § 1.1001-2(a), -2(c).
"See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 399. Indeed, the examples set forth in Regulation section 1.1001-
2(c) do not generally distinguish between corporate and individual taxpayers. See id. at 399 n.9.
29Strong & Hamill, supra note 5, at 667 (noting that section 1001 distinction is based on the
"superficial form of the debt to the borrower-entity, rather than the real substantive consequences of
that debt" to the members).
"See Reg. §§ 1.1001-2(a)(1), -2(a)(4)(i), -2(c), Ex. (7); see also Tufts v. Commissioner, 461 U.S.
300, 317 (1983).
3"See Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(2), -2(a)(4)(ii), -2(b), -2(c), Ex. (8). If debt is reduced or forgiven without
a sale or exchange of the encumbered property, the taxpayer recognizes COD income rather than
gain, regardless of whether the debt is recourse or nonrecourse. See Rev. Rul. 1991-31, 1991-1 C.B.
19.
32Conversely, a section 1001 nonrecourse liability may be recourse under the section 752 regula-
tions if a partner guarantees the debt, thereby shifting the economic risk of loss from the creditor to
the guarantor. See infra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
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B. Constructive Liquidation, Economic Risk of Loss, and Limited Liabilities
Despite the conceptual link between the section 704(b)/752 regulations and
Tufts gain, significant differences exist between the partnership nonrecourse
definition and the section 1001 standard. The section 752 regulations employ the
fiction of a constructive liquidation to identify whether liabilities are recourse or
nonrecourse and to determine which partner, if any, bears the economic risk of
loss for the partnership's recourse liabilities."3 Under the constructive liquida-
tion, the partnership's assets (including cash) are deemed to be worthless and the
partnership is deemed to dispose of its assets in a fully taxable exchange for no
consideration other than relief from limited liabilities. For this purpose, a limited
liability is defined as any liability "for which the creditor's right to repayment is
limited solely to one or more assets of the partnership." 4 Pursuant to the con-
structive liquidation, the partnership is deemed to recognize gain or loss equal to
the difference between the amount of any limited liability and the tax basis (or
book value, if different) of assets encumbered by such liability. 5
Limited liabilities clearly include true nonrecourse liabilities (i.e., section 1001
nonrecourse liabilities) which would be extinguished by the deemed transfer of
the partnership's assets.36 The term limited liability is also presumably intended
to encompass certain liabilities classified as recourse for purposes of section
1001 but as nonrecourse for purposes of sections 704(b) and 752. From an entity
perspective, an exculpatory liability might appear to be an unlimited liability,
since all of the entity's assets can potentially be reached by the creditor. 7 As a
result of the limited liability shield, however, the creditor's rights are statutorily
limited to the entity's assets, without recourse to the assets of the individual
members.3 8 Thus, an exculpatory liability should generally be treated as a lim-
ited liability for purposes of the constructive liquidation under section 752.39
33See Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(1).
34See id.; see also Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(2).
35See Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(1)(iii).36See Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(1), 
-2(a)(4)(i).
37See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 399.38Based on this reasoning, the prior version of the section 752 regulations concluded that all
liabilities of an LLC or similar entity should generally be treated as limited liabilities for purposes of
a constructive liquidation. See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(B)(4)(ii), 1989-1 C.B. 180, 188
("For example, if an entity that is treated as a partnership for federal income tax purposes is
organized and operated under a local law which provides that none of the members of that entity is
liable for its debts and other obligations, then all the liabilities of that entity will generally constitute
liabilities for which the creditor's right to repayment is limited to one or more assets of the partner-
ship because the members of that entity are not required to make contributions to the entity to
discharge its liabilities."). The more concise final regulations, issued in 1991, omit this language. See
Brannan, supra note 3, at 137 n.85 (noting "concerns of commentators that the 1988 temporary
regulations were too long and complicated").39See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 400 (treating recourse liabilities of an LLC as unlimited liabilities
would "produce peculiar results under a constructive liquidation analysis"); see also Rice, supra note
9, at 162 (apparently treating an exculpatory liability as a limited liability for purposes of the
constructive liquidation).
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The following example illustrates the consequences of classifying an exculpa-
tory liability as a limited liability. Assume that A and B each contribute $20 to
an LLC classified as a partnership, and the LLC incurs a general unsecured
liability of $60. The LLC purchases nondepreciable property worth $100, its
sole asset. Upon a constructive liquidation, the LLC would be treated as trans-
ferring the property for no consideration other than relief of the limited liability
of $60, triggering a loss of $40 ($100 basis less $60 amount realized). Assuming
that the loss of $40 is allocated equally to A and B, each member's capital
account would be reduced to zero ($20 less $20 share of loss). Treating an
exculpatory liability as a limited liability necessarily means that any loss real-
ized in the constructive liquidation is limited to the excess of the tax basis (or
book value, if different) of the property over the exculpatory liability.4 .Thus, no
member will wind up with a capital account deficit in excess of that member's
obligation to contribute funds upon a constructive liquidation.
C. Alternative Approach: Unlimited Liability and COD
An alternative approach would be to treat an exculpatory liability as an unlim-
ited liability for purposes of the constructive liquidation. The excess of an excul-
patory liability over the basis of the encumbered property would trigger poten-
tial COD income (rather than section 1001 gain), eliminating any deficit in the
partners' capital accounts.4 In the above example, if the $60 unsecured liability
were treated as an unlimited liability, the LLC would recognize a loss of $100
on the constructive liquidation, since the liability would not be treated as an
amount realized. If the loss were allocated equally to A and B, each partner
would be left with a negative capital account of $30, even though neither has
any obligation to repay the liability. Treatment of an exculpatory liability as an
unlimited liability seems obviously wrong, since it would suggest that A and B
bear the economic risk of loss even though they are, in fact, protected against
such risk as a result of the limited liability shield.42 By integrating the COD
concept and the constructive liquidation, however, it might appear possible to
reach a defensible result.43 Under this approach, A and B would be allocated
MThe portion of the liability which does not give rise to a loss on the constructive liquidation
($60) equals the amount of nonrecourse deductions that have not yet been allocated. See Reg. §
1.704-2(c), -2(d). It also represents the amount of Tufts gain that would be triggered upon a construc-
tive liquidation if the liability were nonrecourse and the basis (and fair market value) of the encum-
bered property were reduced to zero. See Rice, supra note 9, at 162 n.41.41See Rice, supra note 9, at 170-71 (recommending that Regulation sections 1.704-2 and 1.752-2
be amended to expressly incorporate COD in calculating minimum gain and to treat an exculpatory
liability as an unlimited liability for purposes of the constructive liquidation).
21f the liability were treated as recourse for purposes of section 752, then the corresponding
allocations of income and loss would be governed by the recourse portions of the section 704(b)
regulations. The difficulty would be, of course, that any loss allocation under the section 704(b) safe
harbor would be impermissible unless the LLC's members are obligated to restore capital account
deficits. See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 400 n. 15.43Compare Rice, supra note 9, at 168-71 (advocating COD approach) with Reynolds, supra note
2, at 400-01 (rejecting COD approach).
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offsetting COD income ($30 each) sufficient to eliminate the deficit in each
partner's capital account. Since A and B have no obligation to repay any portion
of the liability, the LLC should arguably be treated as recognizing COD income
under section 1001 if the fair market value of the property is insufficient to
satisfy the liability.'
The COD approach should be rejected because it is inconsistent with the
purpose of the constructive liquidation and the nonrecourse treatment of excul-
patory liabilities under the section 704(b)/752 regulations. The constructive liq-
uidation is intended to segregate those liabilities for which the partners bear the
economic risk of loss (section 752 recourse liabilities) and those for which no
partner bears the economic risk of loss (section 752 nonrecourse liabilities). If a
liability does not give rise to an aggregate deficit in the partners' capital ac-
counts upon a constructive liquidation (i.e., because the liability is treated as a
limited liability), the absence of economic risk of loss signifies generally that the
section 704(b) and 752 nonrecourse rules will govern allocation of the liability
and corresponding deductions. Conversely, if a liability gives rise to an aggre-
gate deficit in the partners' capital accounts upon a constructive liquidation (i.e.,
because the liability is treated as an unlimited liability), the presence of eco-
nomic risk of loss signifies that the recourse rules will govern allocation of the
liability and corresponding deductions. Such a deficit means that the partners in
the aggregate would be called upon to contribute an amount equal to such deficit
to repay any positive capital account balances and section 752 recourse liabili-
ties.
For purposes of the economic risk of loss analysis, an exculpatory liability
should clearly be treated as a limited liability, since the creditor's remedies are
limited solely to one or more assets of the entity. If such a liability were instead
treated as an unlimited liability, the constructive liquidation would give rise to a
capital account deficit that would be eliminated by an equal and offsetting allo-
cation of COD income.4 5 The COD allocation would apparently play a role
similar to minimum gain upon disposition of property subject to traditional
nonrecourse liabilities.46 Any capital account deficit attributable to the exculpa-
tory liability would be meaningless, however, because there would always be an
equal and offsetting allocation of income or gain.4 7 Thus, the proper approach is
'See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 400.
45See Rice, supra note 9, at 166-68.
"If an exculpatory liability is treated as a limited liability, the constructive liquidation can never
give rise to COD income because the amount realized equals the amount of the exculpatory liability,
i.e., the fair market value of the encumbered property is deemed to be at least equal to the amount of
the section 752 nonrecourse liability. Of course, COD income may arise upon an actual disposition if
the fair market value of the encumbered property is less than the amount of any exculpatory liabili-
ties; COD income is likely to be deferred, however, to the extent that the creditor can reach other
retained assets. See infra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
471t is not clear whether a special allocation of COD income would have substantial economic
effect, since it arguably does not affect the dollar amounts to be received by the partners. In Revenue
Ruling 1992-97, 1992-2 C.B. 124, the Service determined the validity of special allocations of COD
income attributable to recourse debt. In the first situation, the special allocation lacked economic
effect because the partners' obligation to restore deficits depended solely on the amount of the
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to treat an exculpatory liability as a limited liability for purposes of the construc-
tive liquidation, thereby ensuring that only those liabilities for which a partner
bears the economic risk of loss will give rise to a capital account deficit.
48
In conclusion, the COD approach would obfuscate rather than clarify the
intended operation of the section 704(b)/752 regulations. Under the existing
scheme, if an exculpatory liability is viewed as a limited liability, all of the
partners are entitled to a share of the basis and corresponding deductions under
the nonrecourse rules. In other words, exculpatory liabilities generally receive
treatment on par with traditional nonrecourse liabilities. While it is true that the
members are not deemed to bear the economic risk of loss for the limited
liability, it does not follow that they will be deprived of "sufficient basis ... to
take advantage of special allocations of nonrecourse deductions."4 9 Instead, such
treatment merely ensures that the basis and deductions attributable to such li-
abilities will be governed by the section 704(b) and 752 nonrecourse rules.
III. EXCULPATORY LIABILITIES, MINIMUM GAIN, AND
NONRECOURSE DEDUCTIONS: BEYOND TUFTS PRINCIPLES
A. Overview
The nonrecourse allocation rules of section 704(b) require a mechanism for
measuring and tracking nonrecourse deductions. Under the nonrecourse debt
safe harbor, the concept of partnership minimum gain (PMG) plays four essen-
tial roles. First, a partner's share of PMG (i.e., her share of Tufts gain upon a
disposition of property subject to a nonrecourse liability in excess of basis)
supports allocation to her of the corresponding nonrecourse deductions; indeed,
PMG measures the amount of nonrecourse deductions arising in any particular
year5 ° Second, a partner's share of PMG is treated as a deemed deficit restora-
tion obligation (DRO);51 the deemed DRO prevents a partner's capital account
canceled debt; in the second situation, the special allocation was upheld because the partners had an
unlimited obligation to restore deficits, so that an allocation of COD income disproportionate to the
prior deductions would affect the amounts each partner received upon liquidation of the partnership.
See id.; see also Rev. Rul. 1999-43, 1999-2 C.B. 506 (COD income attributable to reduction in the
amount of nonrecourse debt that had not yet generated nonrecourse deductions; special allocation of
COD income to insolvent partner, coupled with a corresponding downward revaluation of the part-
ners' capital accounts, lacked substantiality under the overall economic effect test and shifting
allocations test); see generally Edward J. Buchholz, Substantiality under Section 704(b)-Some
Forgotten Issues and Some Ancient Concepts Revisited, 10 VA. TAX REV. 165, 244-52 (1999).
4 The COD approach may be even less satisfactory if a member bears the economic risk of loss as
a result of an exculpatory loan to an LLC, since it may suggest that no member (rather than the
lender partner) bears the economic risk of loss. See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 400-01.49See Rice, supra note 9, at 162-63. This conclusion apparently rests on the dubious proposition
that, under section 704(b) principles, exculpatory liabilities must be allocated under the recourse
portion of the section 752 regulations; see infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text. See also Rice,
supra note 9, at 163 ("[I]f the Treasury considers exculpatory liabilities as nonrecourse to the
partners (or members), then why wouldn't it allow them sufficient bases to make use of special
allocations, as it does with other nonrecourse liabilities?").
'See Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(2), -2(c).
"
1See Reg. §§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d), -2(g)(1).
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from becoming impermissibly negative. Third, a partner's share of PMG mea-
sures the amount of nonrecourse liabilities included in her outside basis. 2 Fi-
nally, under the minimum gain chargeback (MGC) provision, a partner's share
of PMG will be charged back at the latest upon disposition of property securing
nonrecourse liabilities, thereby vindicating the earlier allocation of nonrecourse
deductions. 3
The concept of PMG is essential to maintaining parity between the treatment
of exculpatory liabilities and traditional nonrecourse liabilities. Unless exculpa-
tory liabilities give rise to PMG, they cannot generate nonrecourse deductions.
While the Preamble to the final section 704(b) regulations suggests that exculpa-
tory liabilities create PMG, it warns that calculating such minimum gain may
pose special difficulties because such liabilities are not "secured by specific
property" and hence the bases of properties that can be reached by the lender
may "fluctuate greatly."54 The concept of PMG presupposes that property is
"subject to" a nonrecourse liability, and that such liability "encumbers" the
property.5 The meaning of "subject to" and "encumbers" in the context of
exculpatory liabilities is unclear 6.5 One interpretation is that these requirements
should be satisfied under a "floating lien" approach: exculpatory liabilities would
be treated as secured by all of an LLC's assets that could be reached by the
recourse lender.
5 7
Treating assets burdened by exculpatory liabilities as subject-to assets paves
the way to applying the nonrecourse allocation rules to such liabilities, although
technical problems remain. Thus, PMG would arise to the extent that exculpa-
tory liabilities exceed the aggregate basis of the LLC's underlying property 9 A
net increase in PMG for a particular year would give rise to a corresponding
amount of nonrecourse deductions with respect to the exculpatory liability. Be-
cause the section 704(b) nonrecourse regulations fail to "prescribe precise rules"
for allocating income and loss attributable to exculpatory liabilities, taxpayers
must allocate such items "in a manner that reasonably reflects the principles of
section 704(b)."60 Given the differences between traditional nonrecourse liabili-
ties and exculpatory liabilities, however, determining how to apply section 704(b)
principles has led to much uncertainty in the absence of more specific guidance.
52See Reg. § 1.752-3(a).53See Reg. § 1.704-2(f).
54See T.D. 8385, 1992-1 C.B. 199.
55See Reg. § 1.704-2(d) ("subject to" liability), -2(b)(2) (liability that "encumbers" property); see
also Cuff, supra note 9, at 351.
56See Cuff, supra note 9, at 353 (noting that the language of the Preamble "may be carefully
avoiding the use of the term 'encumber').57See Brannan, supra note 3, at 125; Yin, supra note 6, at 153.58For example, a disposition of property would permit deferral of a MGC to the extent that the
entity is not released from the underlying liability. See Collins, supra note 5, at 137 (suggesting that
this technical problem might call into question the presence of minimum gain); see also infra notes
124-28 and accompanying text.591f an LLC has "other debt secured by particular assets, exculpatory liabilities should be treated as
subordinate to such other" debt for purposes of allocating basis (and hence calculating PMG) with
respect to particular liabilities. See Brannan, supra note 3, at 125.5 See T.D. 8385, 1992-1 C.B. 199.
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B. Do Exculpatory Liabilities Generate Minimum Gain and
Nonrecourse Deductions?
The Preamble to the final section 704(b) regulations has sparked considerable
controversy concerning the allocation of deductions attributable to exculpatory
liabilities. One commentator has described the Preamble as "perplexing-no less
perplexing than the regulations themselves."6 The reference in the Preamble to
section 704(b) principles is arguably inconsistent with the notion that exculpa-
tory liabilities generate nonrecourse deductions.62 Another commentator has ques-
tioned whether it is "practically feasible" to measure PMG in connection with
exculpatory liabilities. 63 If no nonrecourse deductions are generated, or the asso-
ciated PMG is not susceptible of measurement, then exculpatory liabilities would
apparently give rise to losses that could not be passed through to the LLC
members; 64 alternatively, LLC members would lack sufficient outside basis to
utilize their share of losses attributable to exculpatory liabilities.65 Such interpre-
tive problems illustrate the perils of inordinately complex and necessarily in-
complete regulatory guidance. Before concluding that the drafters of the section
704(b)/752 regulations have created such an unworkable scheme, however, it is
useful to scrutinize more closely the underpinnings of such claims.
Taking the Treasury to task for "mudd[ying] the waters,"' one commentator
concludes that exculpatory liabilities must be allocated under the section 752
rules governing recourse (rather than nonrecourse) liabilities because "under the
principles of section 704(b) ... an exculpatory liability is treated as a recourse
liability. '67 This comment is baffling, since the Preamble expressly states that an
exculpatory liability is a nonrecourse liability under the definition of the section
752 regulations, as cross-referenced by Regulation section 1.704-2(b)(3)." More-
over, the Preamble should clearly be accorded less weight than the regulations in
interpreting the operation of sections 704(b) and 752.69 Nor do section 704(b)
principles apply exclusively to recourse allocations, as this interpretation might
seem to suggest. The basic principles set forth in Regulation section 1.704-
l(b)(1)(i) clarify that an allocation that lacks economic effect may nevertheless
satisfy section 704(b) principles if it is deemed to be in accordance with the
61See Cuff, supra note 9, at 354.
62See id.63Rice, supra note 9, at 160.
'If exculpatory liabilities do not generate PMG, then deductions attributable to such liabilities
would not give rise to a deemed DRO under the capital account exception for nonrecourse deduc-
tions. See Reg. §§ 1.704-1 (b)(2)(ii)(d), -2(g)(1).65See Rice, supra note 9, at 162-63 (concluding that "only a portion [of an exculpatory] liability
will be allocated among the members. Without sufficient basis, no member can take advantage of
special allocations of nonrecourse deductions.").
661d. at 162.
671d. at 164; see also id. at 163 ("Without further explanation, the application of Regulation
section 1.752-2 to exculpatory liabilities remains puzzling.")68See T.D. 8385, 1992-1 C.B. 199.
69See Cuff, supra note 9, at 354 (suggesting that, notwithstanding the Preamble, a court might
conclude that exculpatory liabilities are nonrecourse for purposes of section 1001).
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partners' interests in the partnership under the special rules pertaining to.partner-
ship revaluations and allocation of nonrecourse deductions.70 Thus, it seems
counterintuitive and strained to interpret the Treasury's reference to section
704(b) principles as a backhanded attempt to deny nonrecourse treatment for
exculpatory liabilities.
71
Moreover, the failure of the section 704(b) regulations to provide precise rules
for allocating income and loss attributable to exculpatory liabilities should not
be taken as "evidence that exculpatory liabilities do not produce nonrecourse
deductions."72 In effect, the Preamble directs that exculpatory liabilities be allo-
cated in a reasonable manner that takes into account "practical concerns" as well
as the need to ensure proper allocation of income and losses attributable to such
liabilities.73 The Preamble clearly contemplates that exculpatory liabilities give
rise to minimum gain, even though it does not expressly refer to such liabilities
as generating nonrecourse deductions. Since the definition of nonrecourse de-
ductions depends on the net increase in minimum gain for a particular year,
however, it would seem to follow that liabilities which generate PMG must also
necessarily generate nonrecourse deductions. The practical difficulty of measur-
ing such deductions and the relative novelty of LLCs are the most likely reasons
for the Treasury's failure to prescribe precise allocation rules.74
A related argument is that calculating PMG with respect to exculpatory li-
abilities "is an administrative nightmare because the fair market value of assets
will constantly fluctuate."75 According to this argument, the minimum gain real-
ized on a hypothetical disposition of property encumbered by exculpatory li-
abilities must be computed by reference to the fair market value of the underly-
ing property, rather than the amount of nonrecourse liabilities as contemplated
by the section 704(b) regulations.7 6 The underlying theory of the nonrecourse
rules is that the fair market value of encumbered property is irrelevant because
PMG fluctuates only with the difference between the amount of nonrecourse
liabilities and the basis of property encumbered by such liabilities. This relation-
ship is readily satisfied in the case of traditional nonrecourse liabilities because
Tufts gain is always equal to the excess of the amount of section 1001 nonre-
course liabilities over the basis of the property secured by such liabilities. In the
case of exculpatory liabilities, however, Tufts principles do not apply because
such liabilities are classified as recourse for purposes of section 1001. Because
the amount of section 1001 gain therefore fluctuates according to the fair market
value of the encumbered property, PMG is arguably not susceptible of measure-
7
°See Reg. §§ 1.704-1(b)(1)(i), -l(b)(4), 1.704-2.71Cf. Rice, supra note 9, at 164 (conceding that recourse treatment "not only flies in the face of the
Treasury's declaration that an exculpatory liability is a nonrecourse liability, but also could create a
limitation" on allocating such a liability for basis purposes).72Cuff, supra note 9, at 354.73See T.D. 8385, 1992-1 C.B. 199.
74See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
71Rice, supra note 9, at 161.76See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 401.
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ment.77 Alternatively, it might be necessary to reassess the fair market value of
the encumbered property annually to determine any net increase (or decrease) in
PMG.71
If the underlying premise of this argument-namely, that minimum gain for
purposes of the section 704(b) regulations is coextensive with Tufts gain under
section 1001-were true, exculpatory liabilities would indeed fall outside the
nonrecourse rules. The purported difficulty arises, however, only if one mistak-
enly assumes that PMG is identical to Tufts gain.79 Notwithstanding contrary
suggestions,"0 the section 704(b) regulations do not define PMG by reference to
the section 1001 standard. Rather than incorporate the section 1001 standard in
the definition of PMG, Regulation section 1.704-2(d) relies on the definition of
nonrecourse liabilities under the section 752 regulations to determine PMG.
81
The nonrecourse allocation rules literally ignore section 1001 and instead treat
exculpatory liabilities as generating PMG in a manner similar to traditional
nonrecourse liabilities.82 If the fair market value of encumbered property is less
than the amount of an exculpatory liability, the combination of section 1001
gain (or loss) and COD income will match the amount of Tufts gain. Once COD
is taken into account, there will always be sufficient gain and income to satisfy
the MGC requirement. However serious the practical problems of measuring
PMG may be, the argument that PMG is unascertainable because it depends on
the fair market value of encumbered property is fundamentally flawed. It fails to
perceive the divergence between the section 1001 standard and the definition of
nonrecourse liabilities under the section 704(b)/752 regulations.
C. Integrating Nonrecourse Deductions, Economic Risk of Loss, and COD
The nonrecourse allocation rules do not limit nonrecourse deductions to those
liabilities classified as nonrecourse for purposes of section 1001. Had the draft-
ers intended this result, the definition of nonrecourse deductions and PMG could
77See id. at 401 ("Not surprisingly, such a computation leads to untenable results.").
7 See Cuff, supra note 9, at 352 ("Must the partnership regularly reassess the fair market value of
property at the end of each year in order to assess minimum gain properly?").
79Such an interpretation is contrary to the literal language of the regulations. See Reg. § 1.704-2(d)
(PMG defined); see also Cuff, supra note 9, at 353 ("The definition of nonrecourse deductions
should have referred to Code Sec. 1001 if the regulations had intended to incorporate Code Sec.
1001.")
80See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 401 ("The regulations under Section 704 define minimum gain
... by reference to concepts under section 1001."); Rice, supra note 9, at 160 ("In determining the
amount of partnership minimum gain.... Regulation section 1.704-2(d) refers to the computation of
gain as required under Regulation section 1.1001-2 when liabilities are discharged as a result of a
disposition of property.").
"
1Under Regulation section 1.704-2(d), partnership minimum gain is determined by "computing
for each partnership nonrecourse liability any gain the partnership would realize if it disposed of the
property subject to that liability for no consideration other than full satisfaction of the liability" and
then aggregating the minimum gain separately determined for each property. See also Reg. § 1.704-
2(b)(3) (cross-referencing section 752 definition of nonrecourse liability).
"See Cuff, supra note 9, at 353 ("A literal interpretation of the language of the definition of
nonrecourse deductions would ignore Code Sec. 1001."); see also id. at 350 (noting that the section
752 nonrecourse standard may diverge significantly from the section 1001 standard).
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simply have referred to section 1001 nonrecourse liabilities rather than section
752 nonrecourse liabilities.83 The reference to section 752 nonrecourse liabilities
is presumably intended to indicate that PMG is generated by any liability for
which no partner bears the economic risk of loss.84 Thus, nonrecourse liabilities
are generally those liabilities for which no partner is personally liable, regardless
of whether such liabilities are classified as recourse or nonrecourse for purposes
of section 1001. Since no partner is obligated to repay such liabilities, it is
necessary to trigger minimum gain on disposition of the encumbered property to
ensure that no partner will wind up with an impermissible capital account defi-
cit.
One difficulty with this interpretation is the language of Regulation section
1.704-2(b)(2) indicating that a disposition of property encumbered by nonre-
course liabilities in excess of basis will trigger "gain that at least equals such
excess (partnership minimum gain)."85 Because of the historical link between
PMG and Tufts gain, it may be tempting to interpret the reference to "gain" as
meaning section 1001 gain. Since only section 1001 nonrecourse liabilities are
certain to generate sufficient section 1001 gain, however, such an interpretation
would constrict the class of nonrecourse deductions to section 1001 nonrecourse
liabilities.86 Another possibility is that the reference to "gain" is simply evidence
of sloppiness or oversight by the drafters who may have ignored the fair market
value limitation on gain recognized on a disposition of property encumbered by
section 1001 recourse liabilities.87 If the fair market value of the encumbered
property is insufficient, the excess of section 1001 recourse liabilities over fair
market value will generate potential COD income.
While the drafting may be inartful, it seems more logical to interpret "gain" in
Regulation section 1.704-2(b)(2) as shorthand for PMG, consistent with the
clarifying parenthetical reference to PMG. This interpretation avoids the struc-
tural inconsistencies that would arise from limiting nonrecourse deductions to
section 1001 nonrecourse liabilities. Since PMG is defined as the excess of
section 752 nonrecourse liabilities over the tax basis (or book value, if different)
of encumbered property, the amount of PMG will always be sufficient to charge
back prior nonrecourse deductions.8" Thus, the minimum gain reservoir would
consist of a combination of section 1001 gain and potential COD income.89
83See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
"See Cuff, supra note 9, at 351 n.221.
85See Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(2).
86See Cuff, supra note 9, at 352-53.
87See id. at 352 ("The regulation seems oblivious to the fair market value limitation on amount
realized when the liability constitutes a recourse liability under Code Sec. 1001.").
8See Reg. § 1.704-2(d).
9Cf. Cuff, supra note 9, at 352 ("The underlying theoretical construct of nonrecourse deductions
relates to a build up in the reservoir of minimum gain that will be recognized under Code Sec. 1001
on a foreclosure of the property .... ). Literally, it is not true even of nonrecourse liabilities that
there will always be sufficient section 1001 gain to charge back prior nonrecourse deductions, since
a debt reduction (without a sale or exchange) results in COD income rather than gain. See Rev. Rul.
1991-31, 1991-1 C.B. 19. The net decrease in PMG may trigger a chargeback of COD income to the
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Ignoring the character of the gain makes sense if PMG is essentially viewed as a
measuring rod for determining the amount of nonrecourse deductions that must
be restored. If the character (as well as the amount) of the chargeback is consid-
ered relevant, it would be possible to.link PMG and COD directly by requiring
that COD income be charged back to the partner who had previously received
the corresponding nonrecourse deductions.' °
To illustrate the PMG concept in the case of exculpatory liabilities, assume
that an LLC incurs a general unsecured liability of $150 to purchase a depre-
ciable asset worth $150, the LLC's sole asset. When the asset has an adjusted
basis of $25 and a fair market value of $100, the LLC surrenders the asset to the
lender who agrees not to pursue the deficiency of $50. At the time of disposi-
tion, the LLC has $125 of PMG ($150 section 752 nonrecourse liability less $25
basis).9 . The LLC recognizes $75 of gain under section 1001 ($100 amount
realized less $25 basis) and $50 of COD income ($150 liability less $100 fair
market value). The COD is not- -treated as an amount realized for. purposes of
section 1001 because the liability is recourse at the entity level.92 The total
section 1001 gain and COD income equals the total gain ($125)'that would be
recognized if the liability were nonrecourse for purposes of section 1001.
Because there is a net decrease in PMG of $125, each LLC member must be
allocated items of income and gain equal to such member's share of the net
decrease in PMG.93 Under Regulation section 1:704-2(f)(6), an MGC consists
first of gain from disposition of assets subject to one or more nonrecourse
liabilities and then, if necessary, of a ratable share of other income and gain for
the year.94 If the LLC's only items for the year are section 1001 gain and COD
income on the disposition, each member must therefore be allocated a ratable
share of these items to match that member's share of the net decrease in PMG.
Under this view, it is not necessary to amend the section 704(b) regulations to
integrate the concept of COD, since COD income would be treated no differ-
ently from other income for purposes of satisfying the MGC to the.extent that
section. 1001 gain on disposition is insufficient.95 To eliminate potential confu-
partners in proportion to their shares of prior nonrecourse deductions. See Reg. § 1.704-2(f)(1), -
2(f)(6); see also Buchholz, supra note 47, at 249 (noting that "allocation of any COD in excess of
the minimum gain chargeback is not governed by any particular provision and is,' therefore, subject
to the same substantiality" requirements as in the case of recourse debt).
'See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
91See Reg. § 1.704-2(d) (excess of section 752 nonrecourse liability over basis of encumbered
property).
92See Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(2).
93See Reg. § 1.704-2(f)(1), -2(g)(2).
'See Reg. § 1.704-2(f)(6).
95Cf Rice, supra note 9, at 168-71 (arguing that COD concept should be integrated into the section
704(b) regulations in a manner similar to Tufts gain). While the section 1001 rationale for distin-
guishing between COD and Tufts gain is murky, the section 704(b) regulations apparently treat an
allocation of COD income as potentially possessing economic effect. See supra note 47. Without an
adequate theory to explain why section 1001 results in Tufts gain in some situations and COD in
other situations, it seems appropriate to treat COD in the same manner as other income for purposes
of the section 704(b) regulations.
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sion, it might be helpful if the regulations clarified that PMG may consist of a
combination of section 1001 gain and potential COD income. Such clarification
would help to eliminate any lingering doubts concerning the relationship be-
tween the section 704(b) minimum gain concept and Tufts gain under section
1001.
IV. OTHER UNRESOLVED ISSUES: PREVENTING EXCULPATORY
LIABILITIES FROM UNDERMINING THE NONRECOURSE
ALLOCATION RULES
Even if exculpatory liabilities generate minimum gain and nonrecourse de-
ductions, policing allocations attributable to exculpatory liabilities may never-
theless pose significant practical problems. One concern is that such allocations
may fail to pass muster under the consistency requirement of the nonrecourse
safe harbor.96 Another concern relates to permissible methods of allocating ex-
culpatory liabilities among multiple assets, which may affect both the timing of
nonrecourse deductions and the identity of the partner to whom such deductions
are allocated. 7 Finally, the MGC requirement may be frustrated if a chargeback
may be postponed indefinitely upon disposition of specific assets which gener-
ated nonrecourse deductions. 98
A. Consistency Requirement
Even if exculpatory liabilities are indeed governed by the nonrecourse rules,
they may nevertheless fall outside the safe harbor provisions of section 704(b).
Of the four prongs of the nonrecourse safe harbor under the section 704(b)
regulations, the most problematic with respect to exculpatory liabilities is the
second prong, often referred to as the consistency requirement. 99 The consis-
tency requirement is intended to restrain the ability to allocate nonrecourse items
too freely. This requirement mandates that nonrecourse deductions be allocated
"in a manner that is reasonable consistent" with other allocations of recourse
deductions which have substantial economic effect and are "attributable to the
property securing" the nonrecourse liability.1" Thus, the consistency require-
ment can be satisfied only if exculpatory liabilities are treated as secured by
property that could be reached by the recourse lender. 0 1
Under a floating lien approach, the consistency requirement would be essen-
tially meaningless with respect to an LLC's exculpatory liabilities. To satisfy the
second prong of the safe harbor requirement, nonrecourse deductions attribut-
9'See Reg. § 1.704-2(e).
97See Collins, supra note 5, at 137-39; Reynolds, supra note 2, at 402-03.
98See Yin, supra note 6, at 154 n.126; Reynolds, supra note 2, at 402.
'See Reg. § 1.704-2(e)(2).
10d.
'Cf. Cuff, supra note 9, at 354 (consistency requirement "should not have been limited to
secured liabilities if exculpatory liabilities produced nonrecourse deductions").
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able to exculpatory liabilities would need merely to be reasonably consistent
with an allocation of any significant item having substantial economic effect.
Since an exculpatory liability may burden all of an LLC's assets, the consistency
requirement would no longer be tied to particular assets. Such an interpretation
of the consistency requirement would sanction "virtually any allocation arrange-
ment desired by the parties."''0 2 The practical elimination of any constraints
under the safe harbor's second prong would mean that exculpatory liabilities
would receive even more favorable treatment than traditional nonrecourse li-
abilities.
The potential of the floating lien approach to undermine the consistency re-
quirement should not be lightly dismissed. The consistency requirement was
added largely to address dissatisfaction with an earlier version of the section
704(b) regulations that relied exclusively on the MGC to vindicate traditional
nonrecourse deductions. 03 The consistency requirement itself is quite lenient,
however, and imposes few limitations on nonrecourse allocations generally. 1°4 If
the safe harbor provisions are unavailable, allocations attributable to exculpatory
liabilities would need to pass muster under the partners' overall sharing arrange-
ment. 05 Denying safe harbor treatment may appear overly harsh, since exculpa-
tory liabilities are functionally equivalent to nonrecourse liabilities. Perhaps a
better approach would be to impose more meaningful constraints on all nonre-
course deductions. 106
B. Floating Lien Versus Specific Allocation Method
The nonrecourse safe harbor rules generally assume that nonrecourse fimanc-
ing will be secured by specific property. If property is subject to multiple liabili-
ties, Regulation section 1.704-2(d)(2) allocates the basis of the property among
the liabilities for purposes of computing minimum gain with respect to a particu-
lar nonrecourse liability.0 7 Basis is allocated first to the liability of the highest
priority to the extent of its outstanding balance and then to each remaining
liability in descending order of priority to the extent of its outstanding balance. 8
These allocation rules are intended to assign basis according to the creditors'
relative priorities, reflecting the manner in which sale proceeds would be used to
pay off creditors if each property were sold for an amount equal to its adjusted
basis.0 9 By assigning basis last to the most "junior" nonrecourse debt, the allo-
'
2See Yin, supra note 6, at 153.
'
3See id. at 150-5 1; Brannan, supra note 3, at 123 n.10.
"
04Brannan, supra note 3, at 123 ("The current system imposes no meaningful limitation on the
ability of partnerships to make tax-motivated allocations of tax items attributable to third-party
nonrecourse debt."); Yin, supra note 6, at 150-52.
"
5See Reg. §§ 1.704-1(b)(3), -2(b)(1).
"See Yin, supra note 6, at 154-55 (proposing that regulations replace the consistency requirement
with a "few selective safe harbors" defining the partners' overall economic interest).
"See Reg. § 1.704-2(d)(2)(i).
""See Reg. § 1.704-2(d)(2)(ii).
"'See Collins, supra note 5, at 137.
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cation rules accelerate PMG and nonrecourse deductions attributable to such
debt. 10 Under the floating lien approach, no nonrecourse deductions attributable
to exculpatory liabilities would arguably be generated until the amount of such
liabilities exceeds the allocable basis of all of the LLC's property, including
cash.'
If an LLC has multiple liabilities, determination of nonrecourse deductions
depends on the manner in which such liabilities are allocated among the LLC's
assets. For example, assume that an LLC's assets consist solely of $5 cash and
an asset with a basis of $50 and a fair market value of $200. The asset (but not
the cash) secures a third-party nonrecourse liability of $40 and a nonrecourse
loan of $20 from an LLC member. In addition, the LLC has a general unsecured
liability of $30 which is subordinate to the other two liabilities. Under the
stacking rules of Regulation section 1.704-2(d), basis should be allocated first to
the two nonexculpatory liabilities based on their relative priorities. If the third-
party nonrecourse loan is superior to the member loan, the basis allocable to the
former is $40 and the basis allocable to the latter is $10 ($50 less $40 basis
allocated to third-party nonrecourse loan). The basis allocable to the exculpatory
liability is limited to $5 (the amount of the LLC's cash), since the $50 basis of
the asset is allocated entirely to the other two liabilities of higher priority. Thus,
the LLC has no PMG attributable to the third-party nonrecourse liability ($40
liabiliiy-less $40 basis) and PMG of $25 attributable to the exculpatory liability
($30 liability less $5 allocable basis)."12
In determining nonrecourse deductions, it is not clear whether a floating lien
approach is the only permissible allocation method or whether an LLC may
specifically allocate exculpatory liabilities to particular assets.' " In at least one
situation, the section 752 regulations permit allocation of nonrecourse liabilities
based on the respective fair market value of the encumbered properties.' 4 Spe-
cifically, Regulation section 1.752-3(b)(1) permits a single nonrecourse liability
secured by multiple section 704(c) assets to be allocated among such assets in a
reasonable manner." 5 Each portion of the nonrecourse liability so allocated is
"6See Reg. § 1.704-2(m), Ex. I(v) and (vii).
'For example; the allocable basis may exceed the amount of excuipatory liabilities because of
significant retained cash flow; in this situation, "minimum gain will not increase, thus preventing the
nonrecourse allocation rules from applying." Strong & Hamill, supra note 5, at 662.
"'There is also $10 of minimum gain ($20 partner nonrecourse debt less $10 allocable basis)
attributable to the member loan; the corresponding deductions must be allocated solely to the lender
who bears the economic risk of loss. See infra notes 129-37 and accompanying -text.
"
3Consistent with the Preamble, the issue is whether the specific allocation method should be
deemed to be a reasonable method of allocating items attributable to exculpatory liabilities. See T.D.
8385, 1992-1 C.B..199; cf. Rice, supra note 9, 166 (arguing that "current law discriminates against
special allocations of exculpatory liabilities used to purchase new properties"); see also id. at 163-64
(discussing the same argument).
"
4See Reg. § 1.752-3(b); see also Rev. Rul. 1995-41, 1995-1 C.B. 132 (coordinating sections
704(c) and 752); Heller & Boyd, supra note 5, at 259 (discussing other reasonable methods of
allocating nonrecourse liabilities for purposes of section 752).
"
5See Reg. § 1-.752-3(b)(1).
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treated as a separate liability for purposes of determining the second-tier alloca-
tion of nonrecourse liabilities secured by section 704(c) property.'16 An alloca-
tion based on the relative fair market value of each asset is considered reason-
able if it does not exceed the fair market value of the asset (net of other liabili-
ties allocated to such asset) when the liability is incurred." 7 While any portion of
the nonrecourse liability remains outstanding, a partnership generally may not
change the method of allocation. If one or more of the secured assets ceases to
be subject to the nonrecourse liability, the previously allocated portion of the
liability is reallocated to other property." 8
For example, assume that A and B are equal members of an LLC, which
owns a single asset (x) with a book value and tax basis of $10. In exchange for a
50% interest, C contributes an asset (y), which has a tax basis of $30 and a fair
market value of $100. Upon admission of C, the LLC agrees to book up asset x
to $100, its fair market value. 119 Immediately after C's admission, the LLC
incurs a $50 liability which is a general unsecured liability. Pursuant to Regula-
tion section 1.752-3(b), the LLC may allocate the $50 exculpatory liability evenly
between assets x and y, since they are both of equal value. 12 Accordingly, under
the second-tier allocation of liabilities, the LLC has $15 of section 704(c) mini-
mum gain with respect to asset x ($25 allocable portion of liability less $10 tax
basis) and none with respect to asset y ($30 tax basis less $25 allocable portion
of liability). 121
By analogy to the principles of Regulation section 1.752-3(b), it may be
argued that LLCs should be free to allocate exculpatory liabilities among mul-
tiple assets based on relative fair market value to determine PMG. For purposes
of tracking nonrecourse deductions, this approach would enhance the resem-
blance between exculpatory liabilities and traditional nonrecourse liabilities, since
the allocable portion of the liability would be treated as a separate liability. 2
Thus, PMG would no longer depend on the aggregate basis of the LLC's assets
allocable to exculpatory liabilities but rather on the difference between the allo-
cable portion of the liability and the basis of particular assets deemed to secure
"
6Under the second-tier allocation, a partner's share of nonrecourse liabilities equals the amount
of section 704(c) gain allocable to such partner if the partnership disposed of the encumbered
property for no consideration other than relief of nonrecourse liabilities. See Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(2).
"
7See Reg. § 1.752-3(b)(1).
"'See id. Any reduction in the outstanding principal amount must be allocated among the multiple
assets in the same proportion as the liability was originally allocated. See Reg. § 1.752-3(b)(2).
"'See Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f), - 1(b)(2)(iv)(g).
12See Reg. § 1.752-3(b)(1).
2
'See Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(2). The partnership has no PMG because the book value of x and y
exceeds the amount of exculpatory liabilities allocated to each property. See Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(2), -
2(d)(3). If partnership property is revalued, the partners' capital accounts are subsequently adjusted
for their share of book items; section 704(c) principles must be applied in determining the partners'
share of tax items. See Reg. §§ 1.704-1 (b)(2)(iv)(f)(l)-(4), 1.704-3(a)(6).
122See Rice, supra note 9, at 163 (noting that calculation of PMG would then be feasible because
"each portion of the liability would become the same as a traditional nonrecourse liability").
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the liability. Because the specific allocation approach would not affect the re-
course creditor's right to proceed against all of the LLC's assets, however, a
disposition of the assigned security would not necessarily trigger a MGC. 23
Thus, important differences would persist under the MGC rules between excul-
patory and traditional nonrecourse liabilities.
C. Deferral of Gain Chargeback
In the case of traditional nonrecourse liabilities, there is generally a one-to-
one correspondence between nonrecourse deductions and the MGC triggered
upon disposition of the encumbered asset. Since the amount realized on disposi-
tion includes the underlying nonrecourse liability, a gain chargeback generally
cannot be deferred beyond the time of disposition. 24 An MGC is appropriate
because the creditor's claim is extinguished as a result of the transfer. Upon a
disposition of property subject to a recourse liability, however, the liability is
included in amount realized only if the transferee agrees to pay the liability."2 5
Thus, the timing of a gain chargeback upon disposition of assets encumbered by
exculpatory liabilities may be significantly deferred.
26
Although surrender of a single asset may eliminate minimum gain attributable
to the particular asset, no MGC would be triggered under the floating lien
approach unless there is a net decrease in overall minimum gain. The section
704(b) regulations clearly contemplate this result when a single traditional non-
recourse liability encumbers multiple assets, only one of which is disposed of.
12 7
Similarly, under the special section 752 rule for liabilities secured by multiple
section 704(c) assets, a disposition of one of the encumbered assets triggers a
reallocation of the liability to other retained assets. 2s Thus, the specific alloca-
tion approach would also permit significant deferral of a gain chargeback upon
disposition of an asset that generated nonrecourse deductions, as long as the
LLC has other assets to which the liability may be reallocated. Of course, it may
be argued that such deferral merely mimics the economic rights of the creditor,
who may still reach the proceeds from other encumbered assets to satisfy the
section 1001 recourse liability. Under this view, a gain chargeback may be
deferred theoretically until an LLC disposes of all of its assets and the section
1001 recourse liability is discharged. By undermining the operation of the gain
chargeback rules, exculpatory liabilities may threaten to create a significant
breach in the nonrecourse allocation rules.
"'See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
124See Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(1), -2(a)(4)(i).
12'See Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(4)(ii).
'6See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 402; Yin,'supra note 6, at 154 n.126.
127See Reg. § 1.704-2(m), Ex. 2 (netting increases and decreases in PMG upon a disposition of one
of three assets encumbered by a single nonrecourse liability).
"'See Reg. § 1.752-3(b)(1).
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V. EXCULPATORY LIABILITIES AND PARTNER
NONRECOURSE DEBT
A. Section 1001 Nonrecourse Liabilities and Section 752 Recourse Liabilities
In addition to the rules for recourse and nonrecourse liabilities, the section
704(b) regulations establish a third set of rules-the partner nonrecourse debt
(PNRD) rules-governing allocations attributable to section 1001 nonrecourse
liabilities to the extent a partner bears the economic risk of loss, e.g., as a
guarantor or creditor. 2 9 PNRD is treated as recourse for purposes of section 752
but quasi-nonrecourse for purposes of section 704(b). 3 ° Rather than subjecting
PNRD to the SEE test, the section 704(b) regulations create a parallel system of
so-called partner nonrecourse deductions (i.e., deductions attributable to PNRD)
similar to the rules governing nonrecourse deductions.' The PNRD rules deter-
mine the amount of partner nonrecouise deductions, allocate such deductions to
the partner who bears the economic risk of loss, and require a gain chargeback
on disposition. 13 2
Regulation section 1.704-2(b)(4) defines the term PNRD (or "partner nonre-
course liability") as any liability to the extent that the liability is nonrecourse for
purposes of section 1001 and a partner (or related party) bears the economic risk
of loss attributable to such liability.'33 The reference to partnership liabilities that
are nonrecourse within the meaning of section 1001 is subject to different inter-
pretations. Under one view, the reference to section 1001 in this portion of the
regulations may be attributable merely to poor drafting, and no special signifi-
cance should be accorded to the drafters' failure to reference section 1001 in
other portions of the section 704(b)/752 regulations dealing with nonrecourse
liabilities.' The alternative view is that the use of the section 1001 standard in
the PNRD rules evinces the drafters' awareness of the divergence between the
'
29See Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(4), -2(i).
"3Under the section 752 regulations, a partner can bear the economic risk of loss for section 1001
recourse liabilities as well as section 1001 nonrecourse liabilities for which the partner is the guaran-
tor or lender. Reg. §§ 1.752-1(a)(1), -2(b)(1); Reg. § 1.752-2(c)(1) (lender), -2(f), Ex. 5 (guarantor).
By contrast, under the section 704(b) regulations, liabilities treated as recourse for purposes of
section 752 are governed by two different regimes: the SEE rules (section 1001 recourse liabilities)
and the PNRD rules (section 1001 nonrecourse liabilities for which a partner bears the economic risk
of loss). Reg. §§ 1.704-2(b)(4), 1.704-(b)(4); see also Strong & Hamill, supra note 5, at 667 ("This
duplicate coverage adds an enormous amount of complexity to an area that already enjoys the
reputation as one of the most difficult in the income tax arena ... .
'
31See Reg. § 1.704-2(i).
'
32See id.
'
33See Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(4) (PNRD is any "partnership liability to the extent the liability is
nonrecourse for purposes of § 1.1001-2 and a partner or related party (within the meaning of §
1.752-4(b)) bears the economic risk of loss").
'
34See Cuff, supra note 9, at 359 ("Was this a subtle distinction thoughtfully constructed by the
drafters, or was it merely sloppy nonparallelism reflecting the work of different drafters .... "); id.
("The difference in language merely may reflect the difference in drafters and lack of precision in
drafting.").
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standards under sections 704(b) and 752, on the one hand, and section 1001, on
the other hand. 35
Without the PNRD rules, it would be difficult or impossible to measure part-
ner nonrecourse deductions, since the section 1001 nonrecourse classification of
such liabilities means that any corresponding capital account deficit would be
meaningless. Upon a constructive liquidation, Tufts gain would always be suffi-
cient to eliminate any capital account deficit attributable to partner nonrecourse
deductions. Hence, the drafters apparently considered the PNRD rules essential
as a "measurement mechanism" for partner nonrecourse deductions.'36 Such de-
ductions closely resemble recourse deductions, since the guarantor (or lender)
generally bears the economic risk of loss and must be allocated the correspond-
ing deductions. Nevertheless, the mechanism for allocating partner nonrecourse
deductions follows closely the rules for partnership nonrecourse deductions.'37
B. The Problem of Illusory DROs: Circumventing Economic Risk of Loss
The PNRD rules deal with liabilities that are nonrecourse liabilities under
section 1001 but are recourse liabilities under section 752.11 In one sense, PNRD
thus represents the mirror image of exculpatory liabilities which are recourse
liabilities under section 1001 but are nonrecourse liabilities under section 752.
For purposes of determining economic risk of loss under section 752, a guarantor's
contractual obligation to pay the creditor is treated as a payment obligation.'39
Depending on the parties' business arrangement, however, the guarantor may or
may not receive a capital account credit as a result of payment under the guaran-
tee. Without such a capital account credit, the guarantor has no ability "to
enforce a [DRO] agreed to by another" party.140 The PNRD rules serve to ensure
that such an "illusory" DRO cannot be used to support allocation of deductions
to a non-guarantor partner.' 4 1
'a"See id. Compare Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(2) (definition of PMG) with Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(4) (definition
of PNRD).
'36Strong & Hamill, supra note 5, at 650-51, 669.
'37Notwithstanding important technical differences, the SEE rules and the PNRD rules generally
reach the same end result: liabilities and losses must be allocated to the partner who bears the
economic risk of loss.
'3"The section 752 regulations characterize as recourse a liability that is described as PNRD under
the section 704(b) regulations. See Reg. §§ 1.752-1(a)(1), -2(c)(1); see also Brannan, supra note 3,
at 122 n.8 (arguing that the Treasury should harmonize usage by "adopting the more descriptive
section 704(b) terminology in the section 752 context").
'See Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(i). Since the capital account maintenance rules do not require that
payment of a guarantee be reflected as a capital account credit, the parties' contractual agreement
controls. See Hamill, supra note 2, at 121 n.94.
'4"Strong & Hamill, supra note 5, at 652.
'
4
'See id. at 650 (noting that PNRD rules "prevent partners from receiving loss allocations ...
supported by illusory rather than real deficit restoration obligations"); see also id. at 671 (noting that
the safe harbor under the economic effect test "arguably treats all obligations to restore as valid to
support a deficit capital account, even if the obligation is illusory due to the presence of minimum
gain").
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For example, assume that a partnership incurs a section 1001 nonrecourse
liability of $50, which it uses to purchase depreciable property worth $50. The
liability is guaranteed by partner A, converting the indebtedness to a section 752
recourse liability because A now bears the economic risk of loss; the correspond-
ing deductions are allocated to partner B, however, who agrees to repay a deficit
of $50. When the property has an adjusted basis and fair market value of zero,
the lender forecloses on the property and A pays the creditor $50 under the
guarantee. A is not entitled to a capital account credit upon payment to the
creditor. B's DRO should not suffice to shift the $50 of deductions away from A
because the obligation is illusory with respect to the guaranteed nonrecourse
liability. 4 2 The result would be the same if A instead made a nonrecourse loan of
$50 to the partnership and was not entitled to any capital account credit: since A
would bear the economic risk of loss for the liability, B's DRO would be mean-
ingless. 143
To detect illusory DROs, the section 704(b) regulations generally treat PNRD
as a limited liability for purposes of the constructive liquidation.)" Because the
partnership is deemed to realize an amount equal to the PNRD, the constructive
liquidation triggers gain to the extent'that the liability exceeds the basis of the
encumbered property, thereby eliminating any illusory DRO. Thus, the regula-
tions respect only those payment and contribution obligations that arise indepen-
dently of a capital account deficit attributable to PNRD145 If such an indepen-
dent obligation exists (e.g., because the guarantor receives a capital account
credit upon payment of the guarantee), then the PNRD is treated as an unlimited
liability for purposes of the constructive liquidation. 146 Because the creditor's
remedy is no longer limited solely to the partnership's assets, the corresponding
deficit is not eliminated upon a constructive liquidation and the non-guarantor
partner's DRO is not illusory. Accordingly, the economic risk of loss is shifted
to the non-guarantor partner to whom the corresponding basis and deductions
may be validly allocated. 47
'
42See Reg. § 1.704-2(i)(1) (requiring that partner nonrecourse deductions be allocated to' the
partner who bears the economic risk of loss).
'
431t might be argued that guaranteed nonrecourse liabilities should be distinguished from partner
nonrecourse loans based on the section 1001 treatment; to the extent that the guarantee is available to
satisfy the liability, the partnership will'presumably not recognize gain under section 1001. Thus,
guaranteed nonrecourse liabilities (as opposed to partner nonrecourse loans) might more appropri-
ately have been handled under the section 704(b) recourse rules. Cf. T.D. 8385, 1992-1 C.B. 199
(stating that such a distinction "may not always be appropriate" and concluding that "in many
instances . . . guaranteed nonrecourse debt is more appropriately treated under the partner nonre-
course debt rules"); see also Cuff, supra note 9, at 359 (questioning whether a partnership liability
can be nonrecourse under section 1001 if a partner (or related party) bears the economic risk of loss).
'"See Strong & Hamill, supra note 5, at 652.
'"See Hamill, supra note 2, at 120-21; see also Strong & Hamill, supra note 5, at 664 n.237.
'See Hamill, supra note 2, at 120-21; see also Strong & Hamill, supra note 5, at 652-53.
"'See Reg. § 1.704-2(i)(1) (bifurcating PNRD into two or more separate liabilities if more than
one partner bears the economic risk of loss).
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In the example above, assume that A is entitled to a capital account credit
upon payment of the $50 guarantee, so that the guaranteed nonrecourse liability
is treated as an unlimited liability. Upon a constructive liquidation, the partner-
ship would realize a loss of $50 (zero amount realized less $50 basis), giving
rise to a deficit of $50 in B's capital account. The deficit is not illusory since B
would be obligated to contribute $50 to satisfy A's capital account credit. Thus,
B may be validly allocated the deductions and basis attributable to the PNRD.
Presumably, the regulations could have achieved a similar result by testing
allocations attributable to the guaranteed nonrecourse liability under the SEE
rules, since B bears the economic risk of loss for the liability. Given the different
ways in which guarantees may be structured, however, the Treasury evidently
considered that the PNRD rules were more appropriate.149
C. Partner Nonrecourse Deductions and Exculpatory Liabilities
What is striking is that the PNRD rules are inapplicable to guaranteed excul-
patory liabilities (or recourse loans from an LLC member).149 In the case of a
section 1001 nonrecourse liability for which an LLC member bears the eco-
nomic risk of loss as the guarantor or lender, the PNRD rules operate as in-
tended because the entity has no personal liability. If the LLC's liability is an
exculpatory liability, the liability is recourse to the entity but nonrecourse to all
of the members. Therefore, if a member guarantees such an exculpatory liability,
the economic risk of loss is shifted from the creditor to the guarantor. Since the
liability is treated as recourse for purposes of section 1001, however, the PNRD
rules are inapplicable by definition.15 ° If the PNRD rules do not apply to such a
liability, it is not clear whether any other portion of the section 704(b) regula-
tions provides guidance. 51
As a result of this "technical glitch," ' exculpatory liabilities for which an
LLC member bears the economic risk of loss (as a guarantor or lender) appar-
ently do not generate partner nonrecourse deductions. Accordingly, a capital
account deficit arising from an allocation of losses attributable to such liabilities
will not automatically give rise to a deemed DRO."' If the PNRD rules are
inapplicable, the only alternative apparently would be to treat allocations attrib-
utable to such liabilities as subject to the SEE rules, including the tests for
transitory and shifting allocations.154 The section 704(b) regulations fail to pro-
148See T.D. 8385, 1992-1 C.B. 199.
49See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 2, at 402; Collins, supra note 5, at 136.
'See Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(4); see also Strong & Hamill, supra note 5, at 645 (stating that "[o]nly
liabilities where state law treats the partnership as the borrower as having no personal liability can
meet the definition of partner nonrecourse debt").
'See Collins, supra note 5, at 136 (noting that "[n]o other part of the section 704(b) Regulations
provides relevant guidance").
..
2See id.
11
3See Reg. §§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d), -2(i)(5). But a guaranteed recourse liability of an LLC may
furnish a limited DRO based on the guarantor's unconditional obligation to pay the liability. See
Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(c).
"See Strong & Hamill, supra note 5, at 662.
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vide any rationale for limiting PNRD deductions to section 1001 nonrecourse
liabilities, thereby excluding exculpatory liabilities for which an LLC member
bears the economic risk of loss as a guarantor or lender.'55 The resulting patch-
work of regulations is thus both extraordinarily complex and ultimately unsatis-
factory: guaranteed nonrecourse liabilities of an LLC are governed by the PNRD
rules, while guaranteed recourse liabilities of an LLC are apparently governed
by the recourse allocation rules.'56 Given the substantive similarity between
these types of liabilities, such a distinction seems difficult to defend or
rationalize.
One practical solution would be to treat section 1001 recourse liabilities of an
LLC initially as section 1001 nonrecourse liabilities for the limited purpose of
applying sections 704(b) and 752.1 7 Such treatment would effectively expand
the concept of PNRD to include exculpatory liabilities guaranteed by an LLC
member (or recourse loans from an LLC member). Rather than relying on the
status of the liability to the entity as borrower, the definition of PNRD would
look through the entity to the members' lack of personal liability in their capac-
ity as members. 5 To the extent that the economic risk of loss is borne by a
member (or related party) in -the capacity of a guarantor or lender, the PNRD
rules would thus apply to all liabilities that would otherwise be treated as nonre-
course under section 752, regardless of the section 1001 classification of such
debt. This modification of the PNRD category to include guaranteed exculpatory
liabilities (or recourse loans from an LLC member) would remedy the technical
glitch under the current regulations, thereby preventing potential misallocation
of income and losses attributable to such liabilities.
One potential drawback is that this approach would expand the PNRD rules
significantly, thereby further increasing the complexity of the section 704(b)
regulations. Such an expansion seems unavoidable, however, if one accepts the
premise that the PNRD rules are essential to measure partner nonrecourse de-
ductions and safeguard against illusory DROs. 59 As a practical business matter,
'
55in the case of exculpatory liabilities, the drafters may have considered application of the PNRD
rules superfluous because all of the entity's assets could be reached by the lender. See id. (explaining
that "the mechanics of the partner nonrecourse debt rules are not needed to properly measure the
amount of real loss potential that exists for allocation purposes"). But this statement seems to
overlook the role of the PNRD rules in safeguarding against illusory DROs. See infra note 159 and
accompanying text.
'See Strong & Hamill, supra note 5, at 663.
'
57See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 402, 399 n.14 (arguing that sections 752 and 1001 need not be
interpreted consistently); see also Yin, supra note 6, at 157.
'58See Strong & Hamill, supra note 5, at 665.
'
9See id. ("If these illusory deficit restoration obligations can support distributive shares of losses
under the economic effect safe harbor, LLCs and LLPs incurring recourse debt expose a major hole
in the partner nonrecourse debt rules."); id. at 664 n.237 (illustrating illusory DRO when payment of
a liability is limited to an LLC's assets). If guaranteed recourse liabilities of an LLC were subject to
the PNRD debt rules, the gain chargeback requirement would eliminate the problem of a "disappear-
ing" limited DRO. See Michael A. Oberst, The Disappearing Limited Deficit Restoration Obligation,
56 TAx LAW. 485, 501-09 (2003).
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LLC members may often be required to guarantee exculpatory liabilities or may
provide recourse loans. To eliminate anomalies under the PNRD rules, the Trea-
sury should harmonize the treatment of section 1001 nonrecourse liabilities and
exculpatory liabilities to the extent that a member bears the economic risk of
loss as a guarantor or lender.
VI. CONCLUSION
It has been suggested elsewhere that little (if 'anything) can be confidently
asserted concerning the nature of nonrecourse liabilities and nonrecourse deduc-
tions for purposes of sections 704(b) and 752."6 This article has suggested that
such pessimism may be overstated, but caution is clearly necessary. Although
the section 704(b)/752 regulations build upon section 1001 principles and par-
ticularly the concept of Tufts gain, they depart significantly from the section
1001 standard. The regulations attempt to define nonrecourse liabilities and
nonrecourse deductions based on the concept of economic risk of loss. While
this concept is itself tenuously linked to economic reality, 6 ' it serves to insulate
the nonrecourse allocation rules from the relatively amorphous and arbitrary
distinctions inherent in the section 1001 standard. Thus, the status of a liability
as recourse or nonrecourse .for purposes of the section 704(b)/752 regulations
does not depend on the section 1001 character of the debt to the entity as
borrower, but rather on the economic consequences to the entity's members.
Within the artificial construct of the section 704(b)/752 regulations, exculpa-
tory liabilities should generally be treated as nonrecourse liabilities which gener-
ate nonrecourse deductions in a manner similar to traditional nonrecourse liabili-
ties. The section 1001 classification of such liabilities should be irrelevant be-
cause, under the economic risk of loss analysis, exculpatory liabilities are nonre-
course with respect to the entity's members. Indeed, a prior version of the
regulations explicitly stated that liabilities of an LLC would generally be treated
as liabilities for which a creditor's right to repayment is limited to one or more
assets of the entity, i.e., limited liabilities. 6 2 Under the current regulations,* ex-
culpatory liabilities should also be treated as limited liabilities based on the
consequences of a constructive liquidation. 63 The concept of limited liabilities
"6See Cuff, supra note 9, at 362 ("This article has failed to identify clearly nonrecourse debt [and]
nonrecourse deductions.... This article has not been a particularly great success in many respects.
We probably thought we knew more at the beginning of this article than we think we know at the
end."). Despite this modest conclusion, the quoted article is enormously helpful in framing the
questions posed by exculpatory liabilities and suggesting possible answers.
'
6 See generally Stephen G. Utz, Partnership Taxation in Transition: Of Form, Substance, and
Economic Risk, 43 TAX LAW. 693, 714 (1990) (describing the regulatory emphasis on economic risk
as "quite disingenuous").
62See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
63While limited liabilities most obviously include traditional nonrecourse liabilities and exculpa-
tory liabilities (section 752 nonrecourse liabilities), they may also include guaranteed section 1001
nonrecourse liabilities for which no partner is entitled to a capital account credit (section 752
recourse liabilities). Thus, limited liabilities do not fit precisely within the definition of "nonrecourse
liabilities" for purposes of either section 752 or section 1001.
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adds yet another layer of potential confusion, however, since the term has no
precise meaning outside the partnership allocation regulations."6
While the section 704(b)/752 regulations move toward implementing a con-
struct of nonrecourse liabilities and nonrecourse deductions that is independent
of the section 1001 standard, the drafters did not fully articulate this goal. Thus,
the existing regulations have given rise to a surprising degree of uncertainty
concerning application of the core principles of the nonrecourse allocation rules
to exculpatory liabilities. Given the historical role of Tufts principles in the
evolution of the section 704(b) regulations it may seem anomalous to treat
exculpatory liabilities in excess of the fair market value of encumbered assets as
giving rise to minimum gain. But this apparent anomaly is troubling only if the
concept of minimum gain is perceived as essentially identical to Tufts gain and
hence derivative of the section 1001 standard. If minimum gain is understood
simply as a mechanism for determining the amount of gain and income to be
charged back to restore prior nonrecourse deductions, however, this departure
from the Tufts concept seems far less radical than might initially appear. Thus, it
should be possible to satisfy a gain chargeback attributable to exculpatory li-
abilities by a combination of section 1001 gain and COD income.
Indeed, it is useful to consider whether the clarity of the nonrecourse alloca-
tion rules could be improved by more explicitly acknowledging and rationaliz-
ing the divergence between the section 704(b) and 752 nonrecourse standard and
the section 1001 standard.6 5 The accretion of section 1001 principles may owe
more to adherence to judicial precedent. than to any well-considered tax policy."6
Rather than awaiting reform of section 1001 and its implementing regulations, it
may be worthwhile to concentrate on perfecting the section 704(b)/752 regula-
tions by exploring more thoroughly the ramifications of defining nonrecourse
liabilities and nonrecourse deductions independently of section 1001.167 Since
"6The distinguishing hallmark of a limited liability is apparently that no member is required to
make contributions to the entity to fund the liability. Even after careful study of the regulations,
however, the concept of a limited liability is hardly pellucid. For example, the regulations do not
make explicit the notion that a guaranteed nonrecourse liability may be either a limited or unlimited
liability, depending upon whether the guarantor is entitled to a capital account credit. See supra
notes 139-47 and accompanying text. For a criticism that the current regulations fail to define even
more fundamental terms such as "liability," see Brannan, supra note 3, at 137. For a recent proposal
to define liabilities for purposes of section 752, see T.D. 9062, 2003-28 I.R.B. 46.
'
65See Cuff, supra note 9, at 363 ("It would be possible to construct a theory of nonrecourse
deductions under Code Sec. 704 that is not dependent on Code Sec. 1001 nonrecourse debt.... Such
a theory based on whether some partner has liability might well be workable, but it requires rewrit-
ing the nonrecourse deduction regulations a bit.")
"6For example, it is not entirely clear why a reduction in the amount of section 1001 nonrecourse
debt (without a sale or exchange) should generate COD while a disposition of property encumbered
by the same debt generates section 1001 gain. See supra note 31. Presumably, such a discrepancy
provides an opportunity for taxpayers to engage in tax arbitrage with respect to section 1001 nonre-
course debt. Without a coherent explanation of such disjunctions, it seems perilous to rest the
sections 704(b) and 752- distinctions on the shifting foundation of section 1001.67As this article suggests, the section 1001 nonrecourse standard is inadequate for purposes of
defining PNRD because it excludes exculpatory liabilities for which a member bears the economic
risk of loss as a guarantor or lender. See supra notes 149-59 and accompanying text.
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the section 704(b)/752 regulations apply only to partnerships, it is not apparent
that these definitions need to be congruent with the section 1001 standard to the
extent that the latter is insufficiently nuanced to reflect economic reality.168
Unfortunately, penetrating the multiple layers of fictions under the existing sec-
tion 704(b)/752 regulations may require more effort than can reasonably be
expected of most LLC advisors, regardless of the soundness of the overall con-
ceptual framework.169
While exculpatory liabilities could safely be ignored when the nonrecourse
allocation rules were initially drafted, they have assumed increasing significance
because of the rise of LLCs. Once the threshold definitional issues have been
resolved, there remain quite daunting practical problems in implementing the
nonrecourse allocation rules with respect to exculpatory liabilities. Especially in
light of the revised section 752 rules for nonrecourse liabilities secured by sec-
tion 704(c) built-in gain property, the Treasury needs to provide more explicit
guidance concerning reasonable methods of allocating exculpatory liabilities
among multiple assets. Perhaps even more importantly, the Treasury should
clarify the application of the consistency requirement and the gain chargeback
rules when exculpatory liabilities encumber multiple assets. Ultimately, the risk
is that exculpatory liabilities may further undermine the existing restraints on
allocation of nonrecourse deductions, which are already widely perceived as
inadequate.
16In the case of exculpatory liabilities, an alternative approach might be to treat such liabilities as
nonrecourse for purposes of sections 704(b), 752, and 1001. Revising the section 1001 standard is
problematic, however, because it would create a new disparity based on the nature of the exculpated
borrower, i.e., as a corporation or pass-through entity.
19For a skeptical assessment concerning the ability of practitioners to understand and apply the
increasingly sophisticated regulations under Subchapter K, see Lawrence Lokken, As The World of
Partnership Taxation Turns, 56 SMU L. REV. 365, 368-69 (2003) (expressing doubt whether the
"intellectual revolution" in partnership tax will "become a revolution in the practical reality of
partnership taxation"). For a more optimistic view, see generally Mark P. Gergen, The End of the
Revolution in Partnership Tax?, 56 SMU L. REV. 343 (2003).
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 57, No. 1
